Language evolution, dual processing and the Representational Hypothesis: a unified account of the emergence of language

Feeney ANDREW

There is much disagreement in the broad field that constitutes language evolution over almost every aspect of the picture of how language emerged in our species (see e.g. Bickerton, 2007). This is a consequence both of the paucity of palaeontological evidence (and the total lack of any linguistic evidence per se) from the periods at the heart of the question, and the cross-disciplinary nature of the investigation. This paper draws on the most recent empirical findings from the domains of evolutionary biology, paleontology, ethology, and cognitive psychology and seeks to synthesise the findings, from a linguistic perspective, into a coherent overall theory. I suggest that all current hypotheses can be classed on the basis of two binary distinctions as outlined in figure 1. The first pair, often referred to as ‘nativist’, are: A) a module of the mind/brain for language evolved in a classical neo-Darwinian manner; B) a module of the mind/brain for language emerged suddenly (in evolutionary terms) – a catastrophist account. The second pair consists of C and D. A range of non-nativist hypotheses are included in the third option: C) language itself evolved as a domain general, socio-cultural system. The final option D), which has scant support, is another catastrophist account: that language appeared suddenly with no domain specific modification to the brain. I argue that all four possibilities give rise to significant problems in accounting for the evolution of language as a result of a failure to clarify the relationship of phonology, syntax and semantics.

	Gradual	Sudden
Module of the Mind	A	B
Socio-Cultural System	C	D

figure 1: possible accounts of language evolution

This causative tension is resolved in the view of language outlined in the Representational Hypothesis (Burton-Roberts, e.g. 2011) in which language is understood to be social, conventional system of symbolic sounds for the representation of mind internal structured semantic content.

The evolution of hominins stretches back some 7.5 million years to our last common ancestor with chimpanzees, our closest extant relatives in the animal kingdom (Sun et al, 2012). By scrutinising the cross-disciplinary data it becomes clear that there were two significant periods of rapid evolutionary change, corresponding to stages of punctuated equilibrium (Gould and Eldredge, 1993). The first of these occurred approximately two million years (mya) ago with the appearance of the genus Homo immediately following a period associated with a comparatively large number of changes to genes and genomic regions, particularly in the Human Accelerated Region 1 influencing brain lateralisation, organisation and connectivity as well as a doubling in overall brain size (Stringer, 2011; Kamm et al., 2013). This era saw the first irrefutable evidence of cognitive behaviour that distinguishes the species from all others, including sophisticated tool use, rapid adaptations to new environments and possibly the controlled use of fire (Beyene et al., 2012; Wynn, 2012; Lynch and Granger, 2008). These developments all indicate a greater degree of cooperation than that exhibited by any previous hominin or modern non-hominin species. However, the subsequent period of roughly a million years is characterised by almost compete cultural stasis in which there are no further significant changes. A second period of evolutionary activity began around five hundred thousand years ago, again involving reorganisation and growth of the brain with associated behavioural innovations, and gave rise to modern humans by at least two hundred thousand years ago (d’Errico and Henshilwood, 2011).

Based on the premise that ‘there is a fundamental duality in human reasoning’ (Frankish, 2009: 105) and the evolutionary rationale that owning two processing systems minimizes the effect that the brain has as an extremely expensive organ by off-loading as much of the work as possible to a less resource demanding automatic system, I adopt the approach of dual processing theory in which modern humans are understood to possess two mental systems (Eagleman, 2011; Evans, 2010). System One is primitive, unconscious, fast and automatic; System Two is evolutionarily recent, conscious, slow and reflective. The first period of significant evolutionary change in hominins resulted in greater cooperation but still under that control of the cognitive capacity evident in modern chimpanzees, System One. It is, however, the second breakthrough that constituted a great leap forward, involving the emergence of System Two type cognition including an advanced theory of mind and a fully recursive, creative cognitive capacity.

I suggest that as a consequence of the first of these evolutionary breakthroughs, the species H. erectus was endowed with a gestural, and then vocal protolanguage consisting of the simple concatenation of symbols (e.g. Jackendoff, 2002; Tallerman, 2012). It is certainly the case that the earliest adaptations that benefit vocalisation (descended larynx, loss of air sacs, and possibly greater thoracic control and greater tongue innervation) are presumed to have first appeared contemporaneously with early Homo. The second breakthrough constituted a great leap involving the emergence of advanced theory of mind and a fully recursive, creative cognitive capacity; fully complex language evolved from its precursor protolanguage to represent the intricacy of System Two thinking. I propose that the theory outlined in the Representational Hypothesis clarifies an understanding of the nature of language as having evolved to represent externally this wholly internal, universal cognition, and it is the latter which is the sole locus of syntax and semantics. By clearly distinguishing between a phonological system for semiotic representation, and that which it represents, a syntactico-semantic mentalese (e.g. Carey, 2011; Fodor, 1975, 2008; Harnard, 2010; Wyn et al, 2009), the Representational Hypothesis offers a fully coherent and consistent understanding of the human faculty for language and its evolution.

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